admin.firstnationalbank.com
Web scan against port 443. Started 2026-08-26 04:56 UTC and finished in 3.2 seconds.
Engagement
- Engagement id
- dac35b55-4e0c-47ab-80dd-ad97e8da0272
- Target
- admin.firstnationalbank.com
- Port
- 443
- Scan type
- Web scan
- Started
- 2026-08-26 04:56 UTC
- Completed
- 2026-08-26 04:56 UTC
- Duration
- 3.18 s
- Findings
- 5
Findings
A request to /admin on admin.firstnationalbank.com returned a login surface rather than a rejection. The administrative plane is reachable from the public internet with no network level gate in front of it.
Remediation. Move the administrative path behind an allow listed source range or a quantum safe tunnel, and require a second factor.
No Strict-Transport-Security header is returned by admin.firstnationalbank.com. A first visit over cleartext stays available to an interposed relay, which can strip the redirect before the browser ever sees it.
Remediation. Return Strict-Transport-Security with a max age of at least one year and include subdomains once every host is on TLS.
admin.firstnationalbank.com returns no Content-Security-Policy header, so the browser applies no origin restriction to script, frame or connect sources. Any injected node executes with full page authority.
Remediation. Publish a Content-Security-Policy in report only mode, review the collected violations, then enforce it.
admin.firstnationalbank.com does not set X-Frame-Options or an equivalent frame ancestors directive, so the page can be embedded by a third party origin and used to capture interface actions.
Remediation. Set X-Frame-Options to DENY, or express the same rule through the frame ancestors directive of the content policy.
The Server header returned by admin.firstnationalbank.com names the product and its build. That is enough to select a version specific exploit before a single request is sent against the application itself.
Remediation. Suppress the version token at the edge proxy and return a generic product name or no header at all.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques exercised
Full coverage view| Technique | Name | Tactic | Mitigation |
|---|---|---|---|
T1190 |
Exploit Public Facing Application | Initial Access | Remove unauthenticated administrative paths from the public origin and place a policy aware proxy in front of it. |
T1539 |
Steal Web Session Cookie | Credential Access | Set Secure, HttpOnly and SameSite on every session cookie and scope the cookie to the narrowest path that works. |
T1557 |
Adversary in the Middle | Credential Access | Pin the issuing authority and require hybrid key agreement so an interposed relay cannot substitute its own public key. |
T1592 |
Gather Victim Host Information | Reconnaissance | Suppress server, framework and build version banners at the edge so reconnaissance yields no version specific target list. |