treasury.firstnationalbank.com
Purple team exercise against port 443. Started 2026-08-26 03:00 UTC and finished in 8.1 seconds.
Engagement
- Engagement id
- 18268c52-98f6-4bab-9ea8-f3d05a2f76c9
- Target
- treasury.firstnationalbank.com
- Port
- 443
- Scan type
- Purple team exercise
- Started
- 2026-08-26 03:00 UTC
- Completed
- 2026-08-26 03:00 UTC
- Duration
- 8.05 s
- Findings
- 2
Blue team score
Red team actions
| Action | Category | Result | Detail | Detected |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Harvest now decrypt later capture harvest_now_decrypt_later |
Cryptography | SUCCESS | Captured 412 handshakes negotiated under a classical group. Stored transcripts remain recoverable once quantum capability lands. | Yes |
| Protocol downgrade attempt tls_downgrade |
Cryptography | SUCCESS | The listener accepted a TLSv1.2 hello and dropped the hybrid group from the negotiated parameters. | Yes |
| Certificate substitution certificate_forgery |
Cryptography | SUCCESS | A substitute chain built on a classical issuing key was accepted by the default client trust store. | No |
| Response header injection header_injection |
Web | BLOCKED | The edge proxy normalised the response and dropped the injected header before it left the origin. | Yes |
| Information disclosure probe information_disclosure |
Web | BLOCKED | Error responses were generic. No product, build or path information was returned. | Yes |
| Authentication weakness probe authentication_weakness |
Web | SUCCESS | The login surface accepted unlimited attempts with no second factor and no lockout. | No |
Findings
The red team ran certificate substitution against treasury.firstnationalbank.com and no detection fired. The action completed with no entry in the monitoring pipeline, so the same technique would run unobserved in a live intrusion.
Remediation. Add a detection rule for this technique and replay the exercise to confirm the rule fires end to end.
The red team ran authentication weakness probe against treasury.firstnationalbank.com and no detection fired. The action completed with no entry in the monitoring pipeline, so the same technique would run unobserved in a live intrusion.
Remediation. Add a detection rule for this technique and replay the exercise to confirm the rule fires end to end.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques exercised
Full coverage view| Technique | Name | Tactic | Mitigation |
|---|---|---|---|
T1040 |
Network Sniffing | Credential Access | Establish sessions with a hybrid group so a recorded transcript cannot be unwound once quantum capability arrives. |
T1190 |
Exploit Public Facing Application | Initial Access | Remove unauthenticated administrative paths from the public origin and place a policy aware proxy in front of it. |
T1539 |
Steal Web Session Cookie | Credential Access | Set Secure, HttpOnly and SameSite on every session cookie and scope the cookie to the narrowest path that works. |
T1552 |
Unsecured Credentials | Credential Access | Move credential material into a hardware backed store, rotate on exposure and require a second factor on every administrative login. |
T1557 |
Adversary in the Middle | Credential Access | Pin the issuing authority and require hybrid key agreement so an interposed relay cannot substitute its own public key. |
T1592 |
Gather Victim Host Information | Reconnaissance | Suppress server, framework and build version banners at the edge so reconnaissance yields no version specific target list. |